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Markets for Money - Does the Garn-St.
Germain Money Market Deposit Account
Overcompete with Mutual Funds
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1980 the financial marketplace has experienced a period
of rapid evolution during which financial institutions1 have aban-
doned their differentiated product and service lines, within govern-
ment regulatory limits, to compete with each other in obtaining
funds from depositors and investors. For example, only commercial
banks historically provided checking account services; now, many
depository and nondepository institutions offer transaction services
similar to checking accounts. 2 The thrift institutions - savings
and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions -
provide their customers with "checking" account services through
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts and share draft
accounts. Investment banking houses, nondepository institutions,
introduced the money market mutual fund,4 which provides inves-
1. The term "financial institutions" includes both depository and nondepository
financial intermediaries that collect funds from suppliers of funds and channel them to bor-
rowers. Depository institutions are commercial banks and thrift institutions - savings and
loan associations, credit unions, and mutual savings banks. Nondepository financial institu-
tions include, for example, finance companies, insurance companies, and investment bank-
ing firms.
2. Checking accounts are demand deposits that the depositor may withdraw upon de-
mand by writing a check. Time deposits pay interest to the depositor and theoretically are
not redeemable upon demand. Time deposits include passbook savings accounts as well as
certificates of deposit and savings certificates. See generally G. SMrrH, MoNEY AND BANKING
107-09 (1982). The Federal Reserve Board of Governors has defined transaction accounts as
"time deposits issued in connection with an agreement that permits the depositor to obtain
credit by check or similar devices for the purpose of making payments or transfers to third
persons or others." 47 Fed. Reg. 58,218 (1982).
3. New England thrift institutions first offered negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW)
accounts in the early 1970's. These accounts, available to individuals, sole proprietorships,
and not-for-profit corporations, paid 51A % interest and permitted checking transactions.
Credit unions soon followed with share draft accounts (so named because credit union mem-
bers' accounts are called shares, which also paid interest and permitted the drawing of
drafts similar to checks. In late 1978 commercial banks introduced the automatic transfer
from savings (ATS) account, which permitted transfers from savings accounts earning inter-
est at 51/4 % into checking accounts. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (Supp. V 1982), expressly author-
ized interest-bearing NOW accounts for all depository institutions on a nationwide basis.
4. An investment banking firm is a specialized financial intermediary that primarily
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tors a market rate of return while also allowing them some transac-
tions privileges.5 Money market mutual funds are the most threat-
ening competitors to depository institutions because the different
regulatory systems for depository institutions and investment
banking firms have created an "unlevel playing field"' for these
businesses in their battle for funds.7
purchases securities from a seller at an agreed price and then sells the securities to investors
at a profit. Investment banking firms have developed open-end investment companies,
known as mutual funds, that continually sell or redeem their own shares to or from inves-
tors. These mutual funds invest the proceeds from share purchases in short-term securities,
such as bank certificates of deposit, Treasury bills, and commercial paper; the funds then
pass the returns, less administrative costs, to the investors. Closed-end investment compa-
nies, in contrast, have only a fixed number of shares outstanding not subject to continuous
redemption. Of the 1600 investment companies registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), 160 money market mutual funds hold $180 billion of the $250 billion
total assets. The remainder are mutual funds that invest in common stock or longer-term
debt obligations. Golembe Associates, Inc., Commercial Banking and the Glass-Steagall Act
11 (Feb. 18, 1982).
5. The Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust (Ready Assets) account is an example of a
money market mutual fund. The Ready Assets prospectus states that the trust
is not a bank nor does it offer fiduciary or trust services. Shares of the Trust are not
equivalent to a bank account. As with any investment in securities, the value of a
shareholder's investment in the Trust will fluctuate. The shares of the Trust are not
subject to the protection of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.
Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust 48 (Apr. 29, 1982) (prospectus). The fund is organized as
a Massachusetts business trust and invests in short-term money market securities including
"short-term United States Government securities, Government agency securities, bank
money instruments [certificates of deposit and bankers' acceptances], corporate debt instru-
ments including commercial paper and variable amount master demand notes, and repur-
chase and reverse repurchase agreements." Id. at 1. The minimum initial investment is
$5000, and subsequent purchases must be in denominations of $1000 or more. The fund
declares and reinvests dividends daily. Shareholders may redeem shares by checks in
amounts of $500 or more. Id. at 16. The shareholder's yield on the fund is his share of the
daily interest or discount earned on the instruments, adjusted for gains and losses, less ad-
ministrative costs. Id. at 23. Thus, the investor enjoys the liquidity advantages of the trans-
actions features along with the market returns associated with the fund's portfolio securi-
ties. The Ready Assets account is only one feature of Merrill Lynch's Cash Management
Account Program, which also includes a margin account for the purchase of securities and a
Visa credit card account. See generally Adams, Money Market Mutual Funds: Has Glass-
Steagall Been Cracked?, 99 BANKING L.J. 4, 12-16 (1982). Other money market mutual
funds may differ from the Ready Assets account in the required initial or subsequent invest-
ment amounts or the required redemption denomination. See infra part lI.B.
6. The Investment Company Institute (ICI), a nonprofit trade organization of approxi-
mately 800 mutual funds, their investment advisors, and their principal underwriters, sug-
gested this metaphor. Memorandum from Investment Company Institute to Depository In-
stitutions Deregulation Committee at 8 (November 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as ICI
Memorandum].
7. In addition to competing with one another, the commercial banks, thrifts, and mu-
tual funds are testing the regulators as they attempt to offer services historically within the
domain of the investment banking business. For example, bank holding companies have
been attempting to acquire discount brokerage houses, which execute purchase and sale or-
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The Banking Act of 1933,8 including the Glass-Steagall Act,9
separated commercial banking activities from investment banking
activities, set maximum interest rates that banks could pay on de-
posits,10 and provided insurance for deposits at commercial
banks.1" Throughout the 1970's high interest rates in the financial
marketplace spurred competition among the financial institutions
to attract funds by offering consumers a market rate on their sav-
ings. Regulation Q prohibited commercial banks and other deposi-
tory institutions from offering a market rate of return on deposit
accounts,12 and the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited them from offer-
ing an instrument competitively equivalent to the money market
mutual funds.13 The drain of funds from depository institutions to
ders of customers in the securities markets. In September 1982 the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) issued a statement indicating that a nonmember bank, a bank not
a member of the Federal Reserve System but under the authority of the FDIC, would not
violate the Glass-Steagall Act, see infra part R.A., by conducting securities activities
through a subsidiary. FDIC Statement of Policy on the Applicability of the Glass-Steagall
Act to Securities Activities of Subsidiaries of Insured Nonmember Banks, FDIC News Re-
lease PR-72-82 (Sept. 1, 1982). In January 1983 the Comptroller of the Currency allowed
Security Pacific National Bank to acquire Kahn & Co. Also in January the Federal Reserve
Board approved BankAmerica Corporation's application to acquire Schwab & Co., Inc. See
American Banker, Jan. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 1. The Federal Reserve Board ruled that discount
brokerage activities were "so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto."
12 U.S.C. § 1983 (c) (8) (1976). The Justice Department and the SEC did not object to the
acquisition. See American Banker, Jan. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
Mutual funds, on the other hand, recently have sought bank charters to avail them:
selves of FDIC insurance and other perceived advantages. In February 1983 the Comptroller
of the Currency approved the applications of The Dreyfus Corporation and J. & W. Selig-
man and Company, Inc., two mutual funds, to acquire or establish "nonbank banks" (banks
that accept deposits but do not make commercial loans). The institutions would not be
"banks" as defined under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, but would be banks for
other purposes. The Federal Reserve Board took the position that the acquisitions would
violate the Glass-Steagall Act and in March 1983 threatened to take action against J. & W.
Seligman and Company under the Federal Reserve Act. The Federal Reserve argued that
the transaction involved affiliation between a member bank and an organization "engaged
principally" in the issue and sale or distribution of securities. In April 1983 the Comptroller
of the Currency announced a moratorium on the issuance of "nonbank bank" charters, and
the Federal Reserve has introduced legislation to restrict the formation of these institutions.
Banking Expansion Reporter, Vol. 2, No. 8, at 2-3 (Apr. 18, 1983).
8. 148 Stat. 162 (1933).
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1976); see infra note 24.
10. Pursuant to this congressional directive, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
promulgated Regulation Q. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1982).
11. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides deposit insurance for
banks, and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) provides insur-
ance for savings and loan associations.
12. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1982).
13. Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); see infra notes 29-34
and accompanying tuxt.
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the money market mutual funds, resulting from depositors' desires
to earn a market rate of interest not permitted under RegulationQ,14 prompted Congress to enact the Depository Institution Dereg-
ulation Act of 198015 (DIDA), which phases out Regulation Q's in-
terest rate ceilings on deposits by 1986. Although the DIDA was an
appropriate measure, it did not eliminate the ceilings and thus did
not permit depository institutions to offer market rates on deposit
accounts. Consequently, billions of dollars continued to flow from
savings accounts at depository institutions to the higher yielding
mutual funds. 6 In 1982 Congress considered amending the Glass-
Steagall Act,11 but finally decided to amend it indirectly through a
section of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act. The
provision now expressly authorizes a new money market deposit
account "directly equivalent to and competitive with money mar-
ket mutual funds. ' 18 The Depository Institutions Deregulation
Committee (DIDC) 19 promulgated the rules20 for the new money
market deposit account, which commercial banks and thrift insti-
tutions began offering on December 14, 1982. The account has lim-
ited transactions features, federal insurance, and can earn interest
"at any rate."'"
14. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), (b) (1976).
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-09.
16. See infra part II.B.
17. See infra part II.D.
18. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Amendments of 1982, § 327, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 3503(c)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
19. The Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee (DIDC), established under
the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 (DIDA), comprises the following voting
members: Secretary of the Treasury (currently Donald Regan), Chairman; Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (currently Paul Volcker), Vice Chair-
man; Chairman of the FDIC (currently William Isaac); Chairman of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (currently Richard Pratt); and Chairman of the National Credit Union Associa-
tion (currently Edgar Callihan). The Comptroller of the Currency (currently Todd Conover)
is a nonvoting member of the DIDC. The DIDC's function is to monitor the phase-out of
Regulation Q and to set maximum rates that depository institutions may pay under Regula-
tion Q until it is abolished completely in 1986.
20. 47 Fed. Reg. 53,710 (1982) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1204.122).
21. Id. § 1204.122(a). Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c), the DIDC established the Gan-
St. Germain account at its November 6, 1982, meeting. At its December 15, 1982, meeting,
the DIDC, under the same authority that permits NOW accounts, 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a), au-
thorized banks and thrifts to offer another new account, the "Super NOW" account, begin-
ning January 5, 1983. 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a) provides:
The [DIDC] shall... provide for the orderly phase-out and the ultimate elimination of
the limitations on the maximum rates of interest and dividends which may be paid on
deposits and accounts as rapidly as economic conditions warrant. The phase-out of
such limitations may be achieved by the [DIDC by the gradual increase in such limita-
tions applicable to all existing categories of accounts, the complete elimination of the
1132
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The DIDC's regulations for the account, which the Deregula-
tion Committee promulgated pursuant to the Garn-St. Germain
amendment to the DIDA, have ignited controversy in the financial
industry. Critics of the amendment argue that the account's fea-
tures favor depository institutions over the money market mutual
funds in the competition for investors' funds. Proponents of the
account, on the other hand, insist that it enhances the ability of
depository institutions to compete for funds to ensure their profit-
ability and a sufficient supply of credit for businesses, government
entities, and consumers. This Note examines the features of the
new money market deposit account relative to the objectives of the
Garn-St. Germain Act and the current financial institutions' com-
petitive and regulatory environments. Part II traces the evolution
of the new money market deposit account. Part III then examines
the DIDC's design for the new account and evaluates the account's
features in light of the Garn-St. Germain Act, its legislative his-
tory, and the competitive and policy considerations underlying the
legislation. Part IV concludes that the account proposed by the
DIDC unfairly favors depository institutions over money market
mutual funds and proposes recommendations for altering the fea-
tures of the new money market deposit account so that it will be
competitive with money market mutual funds.
limitations applicable to particular categories of accounts, the creation of new catego-
ries of accounts not subject to limitations or with limitations set at current market
rates, any combination of the above methods, or any other method.
12 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
Unlike the Garn-St. Germain account, which limits telephone transfers and third-party
drafts to six per month, the Super NOW account does not limit the number of transactions.
The Garn-St. Germain amendment exempts the money market deposit account from trans-
action reserve requirements; the 12% reserve requirement, however, applies to Super NOW
deposits. Both accounts require a $2500 minimum balance, although institutions may re-
quire a higher balance and may pay interest at any rate. Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Paul Volcker voted against the Super NOW account at the DIDC's November 6 meeting
and "told fellow banking regulators that combining unlimited transactions with savings in
one account will complicate the central bank's efforts to control the nation's money supply."
American Banker, Dec. 7, 1982, at 25, col. 2. The DIDC made the Super NOW account
available only to consumers, but invited comments on whether to offer it to business firms;
business firms are eligible for the Garn-St. Germain account. At least one commentator has
stated that because Congress authorized NOW accounts only for consumers, sole proprietor-
ships, and not-for-profit corporations, the DIDC has no authority to establish Super NOW
accounts for corporations. Scott, Legislation Needed on Corporate Money Market Ac-
counts, American Banker, Dec. 6, 1982, at 4, col. 2. The effect that the Super NOW account
will have on the money market deposit account is not clear and is beyond the scope of this
Note. This Note will focus on the money market deposit account's competitive stance rela-
tive to the money market mutual funds.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE GARN-ST. GERMAIN MONEY MARKET
ACCOUNT
A. The Glass-Steagall Act
Fifty years ago Congress enacted the Banking Act of 193322
and decreed the segregation of the securities and investment bank-
ing business from the commercial banking business2 3 The four sec-
tions of the Banking Act that legislate this separation constitute
what has become known as the Glass-Steagall Act.24 The 1929
stock market collapse and the subsequent bank failures2' during
the Depression prompted Congress to enact these Glass-Steagall
provisions. 28 Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act2 7 establishes the
22. 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
23. Congress passed several pieces of financial reform legislation during the early
1930's. In addition to the provisions applying to investment and commercial banking, the
Banking Act of 1933 established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and
provided for the regulation of interest rates on deposit. The Securities Acts of 1933 and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 established a complex regulatory system for the securi-
ties markets distinct from that established for commercial banking. See generally Golembe
Associates, Inc., supra note 4.
24. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1976). The principal authors of the Banking Act of
1933 were Senator Carter Glass of Virginia and Representative Henry Steagall of Alabama.
The term "Glass-Steagall Act" usually refers to these four sections concerning commercial
banking activities.
25. "During the three years 1930 through 1932 over 5,000 commercial banks had
failed; during the single month of January 1933 there were 241 failures, while another 148
failures occurred in February - a rate which, if continued, seemed likely to make 1933 the
cataclysmic year of the Great Depression." Golembe Associates, Inc., supra note 4, at 51.
Legislative history indicates that securities affiliates of banks had used bank resources to
engage in highly speculative investment banking activities. See S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1933); see also Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 61-62
(1981).
26. Both Adam Smith's eighteenth century "real-bills" doctrine, which described the
"proper" function of commercial banking as one of accepting deposits and making short-
term, self-liquidating loans, and Great Britain's practice of separating commercial and in-
vestment banking influenced Senator Glass and Congress. See H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d
Cong., 3d Sess. (1932); Golembe Associates, Inc., supra note 4, at 51-53. See generally Per-
kins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483
(1971).
27. Section 21 provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful - (1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business
trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting,
selling or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks,
bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent
whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon
presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon
request of the depositor ....
12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (1976). This section is the only part of the Glass-Steagall Act that applies
on its face to depository institutions that are not members of the Federal Reserve System.
The other three sections - sections 16, 20, and 32 - apply only to member banks of the
1134
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"wall" between investment banking and commercial banking activ-
ities by absolutely prohibiting firms engaged in the investment
banking business from simultaneously engaging in the business of
accepting deposits. Although member banks may underwrite and
"deal in" certain limited classes of securities-principally U.S.
Government and municipal securities-section 16 of the Glass-
Steagall Act restricts member banks to buying and selling stocks
"without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of
customers .... 28
In Investment Company Institute v. Camps2 9 the Supreme
Court held that the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits commercial banks
from offering open-end investment accounts, which are virtually
equivalent to money market mutual funds.30 In Camp the Comp-
troller of the Currency in 1970 had authorized national banks to
offer collective investment funds.3 1 First National City Bank of
New York then established a fund pursuant to the Comptroller's
regulation. Under this plan the customer would tender funds to
the bank and authorize the bank to act as his managing agent. The
bank would pool the funds for investment purposes and issue
"units of participation" to the customer based on his proportionate
interest. The customer could redeem or transfer these units by exe-
cuting a managing agency agreement with the bank. The Supreme
Court found the Comptroller's regulation invalid because it vio-
lated sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act.3 2
The account in Camp was an open-end investment fund ar-
rangement. Under Glass-Steagall a bank may pool or commingle
trust assets, act as managing agent for individuals with their per-
mission, or purchase stock "upon the order, and for the account of,
customers."33 Each of these activities individually is permissible
Federal Reserve System.
28. Section 16 provides:
The business of dealing in securities and stocks ... shall be limited to purchasing and
selling such securities and stock without resource, solely upon the order, and for the
account of, customers, and in no place for its own account, and the [bank] shall not
underwrite any issue of securities or stock: Provided, that the [bank] association may
purchase for its own account investment securities under such limitations and restric-
tions as the Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation prescribe.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
29. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
30. Cf. Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46 (1981) (Glass-Steagall
Act held not to prohibit a bank from acting as an advisor to a closed-end investment fund).
31. See 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1970).
32. 401 U.S. at 639; see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976); see Brief for Respondent, Camp, reprinted in 28 L. Ed. 2d
1983] 1135
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and a common banking practice. In Camp, however, when the
bank combined these three permissible activities, the Supreme
Court concluded that "the union of these powers gives birth to an
investment fund .... The operation of an investment fund of the
kind approved by the Comptroller involves a bank in the under-
writing, issuing, selling and distributing of securities in violation of
§§ 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. '3 4 Thus, the Court has de-
termined that Glass-Steagall prohibits banks from offering the
equivalent of a money market mutual fund.
Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act3 5 also bars investment
banking firms from receiving deposits. Although consumers may
view as functionally equivalent a deposit account and a money
market mutual fund account, the regulators perceive clear legal
distinctions.3 7 The Comptroller of the Currency has stated:
"Money market fund shares . . . are not deposits. Investors in
money market funds become part owner of the funds and, unlike
insured depositors, their return of both principal and interest de-
pends upon the performance of the funds."38 Consequently, the
Justice Department has concluded, "It is patent from [section 21
of the Glass-Steagall Act] that a depositor is only a creditor of his
depository.... It is equally patent that one who invests in a money
market fund is an owner pro tanto of the fund. 3 9 In addition to
1010, 1013.
34. 401 U.S. at 639.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (1976); see supra note 27.
36. Id.
37. See Adams, supra note 5, at 22-27.
38. Money Market Mutual Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 231-32 (1980) (state-
ment of John G. Heimann) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearings], reprinted in Adams, supra
note 5, at 26 n.81.
39. Justice Department opinion letter from Philip B. Heymann and Lawrence Lippe
to Martin Lybecker (Dec. 19, 1979) (emphasis added), reprinted in Adams, supra note 5, at
26.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has also noted the distinction:
It appears that the superficial similarity of these money market fund services to ser-
vices which have traditionally been offered by depository institutions has led some to
assert the necessity for "bank type" regulation of money market funds. Yet, however
similar the services may appear to be, there are significant legal and practical distinc-
tions to be emphasized: money market funds and bank deposits are not interchangea-
ble products.
A money market fund share is an equity product: it is common stock upon which
dividends are declared and capital gains are distributed only to the extent of the in-
vestment company's net income or net capital gains. The value of an investor's interest
in such a fund necessarily fluctuates as the fund's portfolio of investments rises or falls.
A bank deposit is a debt product: it represents a liability of the bank and provides a
1136 [Vol. 36:1129
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the debtor-creditor relationship, the regulators also stress the fixed
yield and insurance features of the deposit relationship.40 These
narrow interpretations of "deposits" under Glass-Steagall allow in-
vestment companies to offer limited transaction accounts that earn
a market rate of interest, but technically are not deposit accounts.
On the other side of the Glass-Steagall wall, however, the Camp
decision prevented commercial banks from offering accounts that
combined transaction features with a market rate yield. 1
B. The Conflict Between Bank Deposits and Money Market
Mutual Funds
Commercial banks and thrifts direct their competitive efforts
toward the money market mutual funds because these funds
threaten the oldest and most basic function of banking - ac-
cepting deposits. Deposits provide the base for channelling capital
to businesses, government entities, and consumers in the form of
loans and investments. Any decrease in an institution's capacity to
fixed rate of return in the form of interest. The value of deposits in bank accounts do
not fluctuate and, generally, these amounts are insured up to specified amounts.
1980 Hearings, supra note 38, at 7-8 (statement of Irving M. Pollack, and SEC commis-
sioner), reprinted in Adams, supra note 5, at 26-27.
40. One member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has distin-
guished the instruments in terms of their risk and insurance characteristics:
Deposits at federally insured institutions offer the saver assets that are absolutely free
of risk of loss of principal, up to the $40,000 [now $100,000] insurance limit per ac-
count, and that bear a fixed yield to maturity. Money-market fund shares, on the other
hand, are uninsured investments that offer no certainty with respect to the yield that
will be earned over time .... [Money-market funds] do entail some uncertainties not
shared by deposits ....
1980 Hearings, supra note 38, at 245 (statement of J. Charles Partee, member of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), reprinted in Adams, supra note 5, at 26 n.81;
see also Adams, supra note 5, at 27.
41. To compete for funds, commercial banks have attempted to evade Glass-Steagall
restrictions by structuring various products - retail repurchase agreements (retail repos)
and sweep accounts, for example - that technically are not open-end investment accounts
under the Camp interpretation of Glass-Steagall. A retail repo is a sale by a financial insti-
tution of an individual fractional interest in an underlying government security, or pool of
securities, subject to the financial institution's obligation to repurchase the interest in the
security for a set amount within a specified period of time. The premium between the sale
and repurchase prices represents the investor's yield. Under sweep account arrangements,
the bank sweeps a customer's deposits above a threshold amount (from $1000 to $20,000 for
corporate accounts) from his account and with those funds purchases Treasury bills or bank
certificates of deposit, for example, that provide a market yield to the customer. The Securi-
ties Industry Association, a trade organization for brokers, and the Investment Company
Institute usually file suits to prevent commercial banks from marketing these products. The
banks dispute the securities industry's contentions that these arrangements are securities
under the Glass-Steagall Act. In Camp the Court broadly interpreted the term "security."
The subsequent trend narrowed the definition and created the current fluid situation.
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make loans translates into a loss of profits because the depository
institution's primary source of income is the interest and fees
earned on the loans it makes. In early 1978 money market mutual
funds held less than $4 billion in assets;," by November 1982 they
held $230 billion. 3 Many of these dollars drained out of deposits
at commercial banks and thrift institutions, where Regulation Q
limited the rate of return, and into the higher yielding money mar-
ket mutual funds.4" This drain has affected seriously the credit al-
location function and the profitability of the banking system.
Banks and thrifts put deposit dollars directly to work by making
loans to consumers and to all types and sizes of business and by
investing in local, state, and United States Government obliga-
tions. Thrifts and regional commercial banks concentrate these
loans and investments in their communities and regions. Although
money mutual funds also channel their investors' dollars to busi-
nesses and governments, the route to businesses may be an indi-
rect one because many of the investments are in stocks and bonds
of large corporations purchased through the secondary market.
Therefore, dollars that have flowed out of the depository institu-
tions are not available for direct loans to individuals and
businesses.
C. Regulation Policies
While depository institutions have argued that excessive regu-
lation inhibits their ability to compete in the financial market-
place, the historical justifications for regulating the commercial
banking system have been to preserve its safety and soundness, to
guard against concentration of financial power, and to allocate
credit appropriately. 5 Prior to the Garn-St. Germain Act, the ab-
solute prohibition against a bank's offering a money market de-
posit-type account did not further any of these objectives. Nor
does the Garn-St. Germain Act's directive for an account "directly
equivalent to and competitive with money market mutual funds"
contravene any of these important regulatory goals.
Federal deposit insurance combined with examinations by the
regulators and relaxed restrictions on mergers and acquisitions in-
volving financially troubled institutions are the best safeguard
42. Adams, supra note 5, at 8.
43. American Banker, Nov. 26, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
44. Banks and thrift institutions in November 1982 held just under $700 billion in
demand, savings, and NOW account balances. Id.
45. See Golembe Associates, Inc., supra note 4, at 3-6.
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against bank failures. As long as banks act responsibly in offering
the new account and regulators accurately assess and monitor the
risks, the new account will not be a threat to the safety and sound-
ness of the banking system.
Critics have argued that permitting banks to compete in the
investment banking business by offering money market accounts
will further concentrate banking power. Statistics refute this argu-
ment - in fact, domestic deposit concentration among commercial
banks has declined since 1940.4' The one hundred largest banks
now hold less than forty percent of commercial bank domestic de-
posits while the ten largest banks hold only about seventeen per-
cent of commercial bank domestic deposits.4 7 The securities indus-
try, by comparison, is far more concentrated. The twenty-one
largest investment banking firms account for over one-half of the
industry's total revenue and total capital, and between 1971 and
1980 concentration increased substantially.48 In its money market
fund, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. holds over $35
billion subject to checking privileges." If it were a bank, Merrill
Lynch would be among the nation's three largest banks in terms of
domestic deposits.5 0 Thus, the fear of a disproportionate concen-
tration of economic power among the banks does not justify
prohibiting banks from offering money market deposit accounts
competitive with the mutual funds.
Both commercial banking and investment banking channel
funds from depositors or investors to businesses, governments, and
consumers through loans and investments. 1 This credit allocation
function, however, follows a less direct channel through an invest-
ment banking firm than it does through a commercial bank.52
Without an account competitive with the money market mutual
funds, banks and thrifts would continue to lose deposits to money
46. See id. at 98.
47. Id. at 106 (citing C. Golembe & D. Holland, Federal Regulation of Banking 174
(1981) (published by the American Bankers Association and the American Institute of
Banking, Washington, D.C.)).
48. Golembe Associates, Inc., supra note 4, at 106-07 (citing SEcuRrrms AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, THe SacuRrrms INDuSmY IN 1980 34, 66 (Sept. 1981)(Staff Report)).
49. See Golembe Associates, Inc., supra note 4, at 130. Unlike a commercial bank,
Merrill Lynch's "deposits" are not insured against the company's bankruptcy. Thus, the
same public interest considerations apply to the regulation of Merrill Lynch. Yet Merrill
Lynch engages in a full range of investment banking activities in which commercial banks,
because they offer transaction accounts, cannot engage.
50. Id.
51. See supra part U.B.
52. Id.
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market mutual funds,53 and this loss would stifle their credit allo-
cation function as well as their continued viability as profitable in-
stitutions. Thus, the ability to offer the new account will enable
depository institutions to fulfill their historically protected
objectives.
D. Remedial Legislation
The Banking Act of 193354 authorized the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System to establish ceilings on the rate of
interest that member banks could pay on time and savings depos-
its. 5 The Banking Act of 193558 authorized the FDIC to do the
same for insured nonmember banks. Congress enacted these re-
strictions at the request of commercial banks because they main-
tained that banks failed in the 1930's because of excessive competi-
tion during the preceding decade.57 In 1966, Congress enacted the
Interest Rate Adjustment Act58 authorizing the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) to regulate the rates of interest that
savings and loan institutions could pay on time and savings depos-
its. Congress passed the Interest Rate Adjustment Act to protect
the thrift industry from the threat created by depositors' apparent
preference for commercial banks. This Act authorized the FHLBB
to allow ceiling rates for savings and loans that are slightly higher
than those permitted by the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC
for corresponding accounts at commercial banks.59 The purpose of
the interest rate ceilings set out in Regulation Q10 was to protect
depository institutions by restricting competition, first among com-
mercial banks and then between commercial banks and savings
and loans. The persistence of high inflation rates and high interest
rates in the late 1960's and the 1970's, however, led many investors
to withdraw their deposits from commercial banks and thrift insti-
tutions and to invest them in Treasury bills or other instruments
offered by institutions that could pay market interest rates because
they were not subject to Regulation Q. One of these other instru-
53. See American Banker, Nov. 26, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
54. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), (b)(1976).
55. See supra note 3.
56. 12 U.S.C. § 389 (1976).
57. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
58. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(b), 1425b(a), 1828(g)(1976).
59. The Interest Rate Adjustment Act allowed savings and loans to pay a rate '/ %
higher than commercial banks on time and savings deposits.
60. 12 C.F.R. § 217.7 (1982).
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ments, the money market mutual funds, emerged as the premier
investment vehicle in the late 1970's.61
Continued high interest rates and disintermediation e2 of capi-
tal to the mutual funds plagued commercial banks and thrifts. In
addition to protesting the competitive disadvantage imposed by
Regulation Q's interest rate ceilings, the commercial banking in-
dustry argued that money market mutual funds enjoyed a competi-
tive advantage because they were not subject to reverse require-
ments. The Federal Reserve Board required banks and thrifts to
comply with reserve requirements on demand, NOW, and savings
accounts."8 In March 1980 the Federal Reserve Board imposed re-
serve requirements on new money invested in mutual funds; but in
July of the same year the Board rescinded the requirements, prob-
ably because they were inconsistent with the trend toward deregu-
lation of the financial services industry." The depository institu-
61. See supra part II.B.
62. "Disintermediation" refers to the flow of funds from commercial banks and thrifts,
which Regulation Q prohibited from paying market rates of interest to small savers, to
Treasury bills or institutions offering market return.
63. Reserve requirements set a percentage of deposits, from 3% for savings to 12% for
transactions balances, that depository institutions must hold on account at the Federal Re-
serve Bank. These reserve deposits are idle balances and the institutions cannot invest them
or make loans from them.
64. See generally G. SMITH, supra note 4, at 114-15. Historically, the Federal Reserve
Board has focused on M1 in administering monetary policy. Ml, the narrow definition of
the nation's money supply, takes two forms: MIA includes currency and domestic demand
deposits at commercial banks; and MiB includes MIA plus other checkable deposits such as
NOW accounts, ATS accounts, credit union share draft accounts, and mutual savings bank
demand deposits. In January 1982 the Federal Reserve Board adopted MIB as the official
narrow definition of the nation's money supply. See J. PRAGER, FUNDAMENTALS OF MONEY,
BANKING, AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 38-39 (1982). Ml includes neither mutual funds nor
the new money market deposit account, which are subject to zero or minimal reserve re-
quirements. M2, however, does include these money market instruments. Economists define
M2 as MI plus savings and time deposits under $100,000 at all depository institutions plus
money market mutual fund shares plus other short-term deposits. M2 embraces those assets
that can be converted quickly into cash or transactions balances. Id. at 39-43. Thus, as more
transactions-oriented instruments not subject to reserve requirements have evolved, M2 has
become a more accurate measure of the money supply. Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Paul Volcker announced the Board's intention to use M2 as its official measure of the
money supply because it accounts for the new money market deposit account funds. Volcker
cautioned, however, that because of the very low or zero reserve requirements on most of
these funds, the Board may not be able to implement monetary policy as proficiently using
M2 as it can using Ml. American Banker, No. 26, 1982, at 3, col. 2. The rapid growth of the
mutual funds frustrated monetary policy to the extent that M1 became a poorer measure of
the money supply and to the extent that the effects of monetary policy on M2, as opposed
to Ml, are more difficult to predict. Although the absence of reserve requirements on the
new money market accounts may create monetary control problems attributable to the
funds shifted from accounts subject to reserve requirements into accounts not subject to
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tions' problems induced Congress to enact the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIDMCA).6 5 The primary objective of the DIDMCA was "to de-
regulate the deposit taking function of financial institutions."66 Ti-
tle II of the DIDMCA, captioned "Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation Act of 1980" (DIDA), provides for the "orderly phase-out
and the ultimate elimination of" limitations on maximum rates of
interests and dividends that depository institutions may pay on
deposits. ' 67 The DIDA empowered the Deregulation Committee to
achieve these ends through various means including the creation of
new account categories "not subject to limitations or with limita-
tions set at current market rates."' 8
In late 1981 the House Banking Committee established a sub-
committee to conduct hearings on the significant issues concerning
the financial services industry. The hearings focused on
issues revolving around expanded lending powers [of depository institutions],
improved delivery of credit and other financial services to consumers and the
economy, interstate banking, the Glass-Steagall Act, usury and other statutes
affecting consumer lending, and questions concerning the competitive bal-
ances throughout the financial community.6
The rapid pace of change in the financial marketplace appeared to
be "eroding the justification for this system of specialized financial
institutions and its regulatory framework. 7 0 The gradual elimina-
tion of Regulation Q interest rate ceilings under DIDA had not
provided commercial banks and thrifts with enough flexibility to
compete for funds because the rates the government permitted
them to pay remained uncompetitive with the market rates offered
by mutual funds.
Although depository institutions' loss of deposits to mutual
funds caused them the greatest competitive concerns, commercial
banks also wanted to underwrite state and local revenue bonds and
engage in all types of investment banking activities, especially un-
reserve requirement, the Federal Reserve Board's change to M2 as the official measure of
the nation's money supply will mitigate those problems.
65. 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (Supp. V 1981).
66. STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON BANKING, FINANC E, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., lST
SEss., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN A REVOLUTIONARY ERA, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 98,931 [hereinafter cited as FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN A REVOLU-
TIONARY ERA].
67. 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (Supp. V 1981).
68. Id.; see supra note 19.
69. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN A REVOLUTIONARY ERA, supra note 66, at 85, 678 (Letter
of Transmittal from Representatives St. Germain & Stanton).
70. Id. at 85, 679.
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derwriting and distributing corporate debt and equity issues. Prior
to the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982, Con-
gress considered various other proposals that reflected these busi-
ness objectives. 71 In October 1981 Senator Garn introduced S.
1720, entitled the "Financial Institutions Restructuring and Ser-
vices Act of 1981." Title III of that bill concerned securities activi-
ties and proposed to amend Glass-Steagall in two ways. First, the
Act would permit national banks to underwrite municipal revenue
bonds, and second, any depository institution or bank holding
company or subsidiary could organize, sponsor, operate, control, or
render investment advice to an investment company or could un-
derwrite, distribute, sell, or issue securities of any investment
company.72
The Administration through Secretary of the Treasury Donald
T. Regan also submitted a proposal, entitled the "Bank Holding
Company Deregulation Act of 1982." The Administration's propo-
sal would have amended the Glass-Steagall Act by permitting de-
pository institutions to sponsor mutual funds, underwrite revenue
bonds, and engage in other securities activities through subsidiar-
ies of bank holding companies. These separate corporate affiliates,
primarily regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940,
would have been subject to the rules, regulations, and tax treat-
ment of investment companies. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission supported the Administration's proposal. In his statement
before the Senate Committee on Banking, John S.R. Shad, Chair-
man of the Securities and Exchange Commission, said: "[T]he
challenge we face is clear: to eliminate unnecessary restrictions on
competition while, at the same time, (1) preserving the investor
protections which are so important to capital raising in this nation,
(2) protecting the solvency of our banking institutions, and (3)
avoiding the creation of unfair competitive advantages."73 Chair-
man Shad added that the Administration's proposal was consistent
with the Commission's functional approach to regulation. 4
Rather than directly amend the Glass-Steagall Act under ei-
ther S. 1720 or the Administration's proposal, by expressly permit-
ting banks to engage in traditionally nonbank activities, Congress
71. These proposals represented the legislative embodiment of the competitive institu-
tion-designed products discussed supra note 40.
72. S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302(h)(1)(A), (B) (1981).
73. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Sen. Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1982).
74. Id.
1983] 1143
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1129
chose indirectly to amend the Glass-Steagall Act by amending the
section of the DIDA that provides for the "orderly phase-out and
the ultimate elimination of" maximum interest rates on deposits.7 5
Section 327 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982 amends the DIDA by requiring the DIDC to authorize a new
deposit account "directly equivalent to and competitive with
money market mutual funds registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission under the Investment Company Act of
1940."9 76 Because Congress created a totally new product, instead of
redefining the permissible activities of depository and nonde-
pository institutions, the securities industry and banks will con-
tinue to debate the meanings of "security" 77 under the Glass-Stea-
gall Act.7 8 In addition, the new money market deposit account,
which the DIDC authorized pursuant to section 327 of the Garn-
St. Germain Act, poses another question for debate: does the ac-
count comply with the congressional directive that it "be directly
equivalent to and competitive with money market mutual funds"?
III. THE GARN-ST. GERMAIN MONEY MARKET DEPOSIT ACCOUNT
Section 32779 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982, an amendment to the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation Act of 1980,80 authorizes a new money market deposit ac-
count.8 1 The provision states:
(c)(1) The [Depository Institutions Deregulation] Committee [DIDC] shall is-
75. 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (Supp. V 1981).
76. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503(c) (Supp. 1983).
77. E.g. A. G. Becker v. Bd. of Governors, 693 F.2d 136 (D.D.C. 1982); see also supra
note 7.
78. On July 12, 1983, congressmen introduced identical bills in the Senate and in the
House of Representatives "[t]o authorize depository institution holding companies to engage
in activities of a financial nature, insurance underwriting and brokerage, real estate develop-
ment and brokerage, and certain securities activities including dealing in, underwriting and
purchasing government and municipal securities, sponsoring and managing investment com-
panies and underwriting the securities thereof...." S. 1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983);
H.R. 3537, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
79. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503(c) (West Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (Supp. V 1981).
81. In addition to authorizing this new deposit account, these 1982 amendments ex-
panded FDIC and FSLIC powers to assist troubled institutions and relaxed merger require-
ments for these institutions, broadened the lending and investment powers of federal thrift
institutions, preempted-with some exceptions-prohibitions against the enforcement of
due on sale clauses on mortgages, amended various statutory provisions affecting commer-
cial banks' lending and borrowing limits, exempted small depository institutions from re-
serve requirements, broadened the lending powers of credit unions, and restricted the insur-
ance activities of bank holding companies. S. REP. No. 97-536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
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sue a regulation authorizing a new deposit account, effective not later than 60
days after October 15, 1982. Such account shall be directly equivalent to and
competitive with money market mutual funds registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940. (2)
No limitation on the maximum rate or rates of interest payable on deposit
accounts shall apply to the account authorized by this subsection. 1
Section 327 exempts the account from transaction reserve require-
ments,83 but leaves other features of the account to the DIDC's84
discretion." In requesting comments on the new accounts, the
DIDC stated that the Gan-St. Germain Act and its legislative his-
tory required certain features, including no interest rate limitation
and federal deposit insurance.86
82. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503(c) (West Supp. 1983) (emphasis added). Section 327 also
provides:
(3) For purposes of section 19(b) of the Federal Reserve Act, accounts established pur-
suant to this subsection which are not 'transaction accounts' as defined by the reserve
requirement regulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as
those regulations existed on August 1, 1982, shall not be subject to transaction account
reserves, even though no minimum maturity is required, and even though up to three
preauthorized or automatic transfers and three transfers to third parties are permitted
monthly.
Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
85. On October 19, 1982, the DIDC issued a notice of a 15 day period during which
interested parties could comment on features of the proposed account. 47 Fed. Reg. 46,530
(1982). The Committee stated that the short comment period was necessary because "the
Garn-St. Germain Act required the new account to be available within sixty days of enact-
ment. Because the Committee desires to give depository institutions adequate time to pre-
pare and market the account, time for comment must be limited to allow time for computa-
tion and consideration of the comments, a Committee vote on the features and publication
of the final rule." Id. at 46,531. Although the Committee did not limit issues for comments,
it particularly requested comments on the following aspects: The minimum initial denomi-
nations; the "maintenance" balance; payment of a lower interest rate on accounts falling
below the maintenance balance; requirement of a minimum denomination for drafts; the
requirement of notice prior to withdrawal; availability of loans to meet the minimum initial
denomination; restrictions on additional deposits, e.g., sweeps from other accounts; limita-
tion of the time period for which an institution can guarantee an interest rate; monitoring
and enforcement of the limitation on the number of withdrawals per month; restrictions on
overdraft credit arrangements in connection with this account; limitations on withdrawals
by mail, telephone, messenger, or in person; and adequacy of lead time for implementing
operation changes for the account. Id.
86. The DIDC notice enumerated the following requirements:
(1) No minimum maturity; (2) no interest rate ceilings; (3) an initial minimum denomi-
nation no greater than $5,000; (4) allow up to three pre-authorized or automatic trans-
fers and three other third-party payments (including drafts) per month without being
subject to transaction account reserve requirements; (5) available to all depositors; and
(6) insured by the FDIC or FSLIC.
Id.
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Senator Garn issued a report87 in which he discussed the De-
pository Institutions Amendments of 1982. He noted that the per-
iod since the enactment of the DIDMCA8 e had been one of "un-
precedented high interest rates that have caused havoc to
depository institutions ....,"" Citing statistical evidence of the
competitive imbalance between depository and nondepository in-
stitutions,90 Senator Garn explained that the new deposit account
would permit regulated depository institutions to compete directly
with money market mutual funds."' Senator Garn also noted that
the account would be an FDIC or FSLIC insured deposit account.92
A. The DIDC's Regulation
The DIDC promulgated rules for the new account on Decem-
ber 14, 1982.93 According to these rules depository institutions may
pay interest at "any rate" on this account. The initial balance must
be greater than or equal to $2500 and the minimum average bal-
ance for a period not to exceed one month must be greater than or
equal to $2500. If the minimum average balance falls below $2500,
then the amount of interest paid on the account may not exceed
the ceiling rate for NOW accounts.9 4 A depository institution may
not guarantee or obligate itself to pay a rate of interest for a period
exceeding one month, and the institution must reserve the right to
require seven days notice of withdrawal. Restrictions on transfers
are minimal: no minimum denomination amount is required; and
no restrictions apply to the number of transfers directly to the de-
positor,e5 but transfers to third parties or preauthorized transfers
87. S. REP. No. 97-536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
88. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 142 (1980); see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
89. S. RFP. No. 97-536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982). Senator Garn stated:
The continuing existence of Regulation Q disadvantages depository institutions subject
to it in competing for consumer savings with less regulated intermediaries. Thus, the
Committee is directing DDC to create a new type of deposit instrument that will pro-
vide regulated depository institutions with the ability to compete directly with the
money market mutuals.
Id.
90. Senator Gain stated that "[tihe statistical evidence of the competitive imbalance.
is measurable by the fact that the asset size of the money market mutual funds grew from
$60.9 billion in March 1980 to $203.3 billion in June 1982, an increase of over 230 percent."
Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 19.
93. 12 C.F.R. § 1204.122 (1983).
94. Id. The ceiling rate for NOW accounts is currently 51 %.
95. Id. The depositor's unlimited privileges for direct transfer apply to transfers made
in person, by mail, by messenger, or by automated teller machine. Id.
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may not exceed six per month. The rules permit overdrafts on the
account if the rate of interest charged is not less than that imposed
on overdrafts for customers of other accounts. No restrictions ap-
ply regarding additional deposits and sweeps from other accounts
into the money market account. Finally, the depository institution
may not lend to the customers to meet the $2500 initial balance or
the $2500 minimum average balance requirement.
B. Comparison Between Money Market Deposit Accounts and
Money Market Mutual Fund Accounts
Although different types of financial institutions administer
the money market deposit accounts and the money market mutual
fund accounts, the institutions market the accounts to appeal to
similar needs and to provide similar services. Consequently, both
types of accounts offer similar features. An institution may vary
the characteristics of the account it offers according to market and
regulatory constraints. The characteristics of different institutions'
money market mutual funds vary more than those of money mar-
ket deposit accounts, perhaps because the money market mutual
funds are not regulated as strictly as the money market deposit
accounts for which the DIDC has promulgated express guidelines."'
Most commercial banks require a minimum initial investment
and a maintenance balance of $5000 for the money market deposit
account; savings and loans and mutual savings banks generally
have set their minimum and maintenance balance requirements at
$2500. 9 The initial deposit requirements for money market mutual
funds accounts range from less than $500 to $10,000, with over
three-quarters of the funds falling in the $1000 to $3000 range.98
The money market mutual fund investor's return is the yield on
the assets held by the mutual fund less administrative costs. Re-
tail-oriented money market mutual funds allow the account bal-
ance to fall substantially below the initial investment requirement
while continuing to pay the investor the market rate of return."' If
96. See supra part M.A.
97. Commercial banks chose the higher figure because it would result in fewer internal
transfers from lower cost deposits to the higher cost account.
98. Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee, Staff Memorandum 12 (Nov. 10,
1982) [hereinafter cited as DIDC Memorandum] (citing Donaghue's Money Fund Directory
(spring-summer 1982)). Ninety-eight percent of the sample 125 funds require an initial min-
imum investment of $5000 or less. Id.
99. Id. at 13. The DIDC staff surveyed 20 large retail-oriented funds and found none
with a maintenance balance requirement greater than $1000. Id.
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the balance falls below the required minimum, however, the insti-
tution restricts the interest to the rate paid on NOW ac-
counts-currently 5 percent.
The money market deposit account usually earns the "money
market rate," a rate entirely within the discretion of the depository
institution. While most banks have not disclosed their formulas for
computing the money market rate, many banks have set the rate at
least one hundred basis points1 00 above the Donaghue money mar-
ket index. 101 By setting the rates at this level during the introduc-
tory period of the money market deposit accounts, the banks have
hoped to attract depositors away from mutual funds.
Transaction priviledges offered by the two types of accounts
also vary. Money market mutual funds typically do not restrict the
number of withdrawals an investor may make,10 2 but the mutual
funds usually require a minimum draft amount of $500.10s By com-
parison, the money market deposit account customer may make an
unlimited number of withdrawals in person for any dollar
amount.10 4 The customer also may preauthorize withdrawals and
write up to three checks per month as long as the total number
plus preauthorized withdrawals does not exceed six per month.
Both accounts are available to individual and corporate
investors.10 5
100. A basis point equals .01% so that 100 basis points is 1.0%.
101. The Donaghue money market index is published by William Donaghue in a
money fund newsletter on a weekly and a monthly basis.
102. The average number of redemptions and checks on a money market mutual fund
account is 12 per year. DIDC Memorandum, supra note 98, app. D.
103. Id. at 19.
104. The money market deposit account customer also may have access to his account
through automated teller machines.
105. The NOW account is not available to corporations. See supra note 21.
The following table summarizes the features of the two accounts:
[Vol. 36:11291148
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The DIDC's Position
Following the passage of Section 327 of the Garn-St. Germain
Act, e10 the DIDC requested comments on the design of the new
money market deposit instrument on October 19, 1982.107 Relying
on the language of section 327, the DIDC adopted the position that
the account should be "directly equivalent to and competitive
with" money market mutual funds, should not be subject to any
limitation on the maximum interest rate payable, should not be
subject to transaction account reserve requirements, and should be
available on or before December 14, 1982.108 In addition, the DIDC
interpreted the Senate Report 0 9 on the amendment to reflect con-
gressional intent that the account have federal insurance at the
discretion of the FDIC and FSLIC.110 In designing the new ac-
count, the DIDC divided the possible features of the account into
two categories: those features "either specifically mandated by the
language of Section 327 of the [Garn-St. German] Act or suggested
Money Market Money Market
Deposit Accounty Mutual Fund
Initial Minimum Investment $2500 or $5000 $500 to $10,000,
with 98% less than
or equal to $5000
Maintenance Balance $2500 or $5000 generally under
$1000
Rate "any rate," typically yield on fund assets
up to 100 basis less administrative
points over costs
Donaghue index
Transfers per month 6 plus unlimited no limit but average
withdrawals in of 1 per month
person
Minimum denomination for drafts none typically $500
Insurance up to $100,000 not insured
106. See supra note 79.
107. 47 Fed. Reg. 46,530 (1982). As of November 3, 1982, the Committee had received
1227 responses: 752 from commercial banks, 297 from savings and loan associations, 57 from
mutual savings banks, 3 from credit unions, 5 from money market mutual funds and affili-
ated institutions, 36 from industry trade associations, 12 from regulators, and 65 from indi-
viduals and other businesses. DIC Memorandum, supra note 98, at 2-3.
108. DIDC Memorandum, supra note 98, at 2.
109. S. REP. No. 97-536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); see supra notes 87-89 and accom-
panying text.
110. DIDC Memorandum, supra note 98, at 6 & app. E. The FDIC and FSLIC have
insured the new accounts consistent with the section 327 directive.
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by the Act's legislative history";' and those features not expressly
mandated by the Act or suggested by its legislative history that
nevertheless must be incorporated in the new account.112 For those
characteristics in the latter category, including "minimum denomi-
nation, specific transaction capabilities, withdrawal features, reser-
vation notice period, and other miscellaneous items,"" 3 the DIDC
staff recommended that "the guiding principle should be to create
an account 'directly equivalent to and competitive with' [money
market mutual funds]. 1 1 4 On these matters within the DIDC's dis-
cretion, the staff recommended that the DIDC set as few restric-
tions as possible in order to enhance the depository institutions'
ability to compete. 5 The DIDC staff, however, indicated that the
DIDC had no discretion about incorporating the characteristics
falling within the first category. Thus, the staff determined that
the new account must "have no minimun maturity; have no inter-
est rate ceiling; have an initial denomination no greater than
$5000; allow three preauthorized or automatic transfers per month;
be made available to all classes of depositors; be an FDIC - or
FSLIC - insured deposit; and be effective no later than December14, 1982. ''1111
The controversy about the new account centered on the statu-
tory provisions that the account "shall be directly equivalent to
and competitive with money market mutual funds,""7 that "no
limitation on the maximum rate or rates of interest payable ...
shall apply to the account,"11 8 and that the account receive insur-
ance. The DIDC staff rejected the suggestion that a ceilingless ac-
count would be inconsistent with the Act's requirement that the
account be "'directly equivalent to and competitive with money
market mutual funds.' "119 Peter Walleson, General Counsel of the
Treasury, has asserted that because Congress expressly included
the ceilingless rate langauge in section 327, Congress believed that
the two provisions are consistent.120 Mr. Walleson concluded that
111. Id. at 7.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Garn-St. Germain Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503(c)(1)(West Supp. 1983).
118. Id. § 3503(c)(2).
119. DIDC Memorandum, supra note 98, at 4-5.
120. Mr. Walleson addressed the DIDC panel at its November 15, 1982, meeting on
the issue of Congress' intent in the "directly equivalent to and competitive with money
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Congress authorized the DIDC to design an insured, ceilingless
rate account that would be directly equivalent to and competitive
with money market mutual funds.121 After very little discussion the
DIDC voted to approve the first category of features that section
327 and the legislative history of the Garn-St. Germain Act man-
dated: no minimum maturity, no interest rate ceiling, required ini-
tial investment not greater than $5000, certain limited transactions
features, availability to all investors, and federal deposit insurance
coverage. 122 Because the DIDC perceived no conflict between the
"directly equivalent to and competitive with money market mutual
funds" language and the ceilingless rate and insurance provisions,
it did not indicate how it would have resolved any conflict.
B. The Investment Company Institute's Position
Immediately after the DIDC's Notice of Proposed Rule-mak-
ing issued on October 19, 1982,123 the ICII24 filed suit s12 in federal
court, asking the court to declare the notice null and void. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied
the ICI's request and found that the DIDC's actions were not re-
viewable until promulgation of a final rule.1 26 The ICI then issued
to the DIDC a memorandum setting forth its position.2 1 The ICI's
two main concerns were that the rate of interest on the money
market deposit account might exceed current market rates, and
that federal deposit insurance would cover this new account. ICI
maintained that these features would allow an institution to effect
a predatory pricing scheme or to develop a speculative pricing plan
in order to raise money, with the FDIC guaranteeing the venture in
the event of failure.128 The ICI stated that "this represents bad
public policy and, of more immediate concern to the [DIDC], is
contrary to the statutory directives which govern the Committee in
market mutual funds" language. Tape Recording of DIDC meeting, Nov. 11, 1982 (available
from DIDC offices, Washington, D.C.).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 6.
125. Complaint, Investment Co. Inst. v. Depository Institutions Deregulation Comm.,
No. 82-3037 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1982). The ICI alleged that the notice as promulgated violated
the due process clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and the Administrative Procedure Act.
126. Investment Co. Inst. v. Depository Institutions Deregulation Comm., No. 82-3037
(D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1982).
127. ICI Memorandum, supra note 6. This memorandum was in response to the
DIDC's request for comments. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
128. ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, at 3.
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structuring the [money market deposit] account. '129 The ICI ar-
gued that the DIDC should have focused on money market mutual
funds when designing the new money market deposit account. Fea-
tures of the money market mutual funds to which the ICI directed
the DIDC's attention included a market-related yield, availability
to all investors, extensive disclosure concerning the nature of the
investment to all investors, no regulatory minimum investment re-
quirements, and no insurance.130
The ICI first addressed the problem created by the DIDC's
permitting the new account to pay interest "at any rate." The ICI
maintained that an account which has no ceiling on the rate paid
does not satisfy the objectives of section 327, the Garn-St. Germain
Act, and the DIDA, because if the rate is not a market rate, the
account would not be equivalent to a money market mutual
fund."'1 A deposit and a mutual fund share are inherently different
because the interest payable on a deposit is not derived directly
from the return on a pool of assets, like that of a mutual fund
share.132 To accommodate this difference, the ICI suggested that
the rate of return on the account could be referenced to an appro-
priate market rate. For example, the appropriate rate of interest
for an insured account could be indexed to the rate of return on a
riskless investment, such as a short-term Treasury bill. Section
327, however, specifically provided that "no limitation on the max-
imum rate or rates of interest payable on deposit accounts shall
apply to the account authorized by this subsection."'3 3 The ICI
urged that this language must mean that the Regulation Q ceilings
do not apply to the account - the account should pay a competi-
tive market rate of interest - if the result is to be consistent with
the purposes of section 327, the Garn-St. Germain Act, and the
DIDA.13 4
The ICI next expressed two concerns about the new account's
insurance feature. First, an insured account that pays a rate higher
than the market Treasury bill rate inherently is not equivalent to a
money market mutual fund. Second, such an account would en-
courage risk-taking by depository institutions and thus would
threaten the deposit insurance agencies. The ICI argued:
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 21.
133. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503(c) (West Supp. 1983).
134. ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, at 22-26.
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It is axiomatic that an account that pays the same rate of interest as an
uninsured money market mutual fund, but which is also federally insured, is
an account that is not 'directly equivalent to' a money market mutual fund
investment. The value of federal deposit insurance is quantifiable and has
been recognized - repeatedly - by the Committee's own staff... in numer-
ous Committee staff memoranda.13 5
The ICI offered persuasive evidence that insurance on a
money market deposit account that pays a rate of interest as high
or higher than mutual funds would give depository institutions a
competitive advantage unless the DIDC referenced the interest
rate paid of these insured accounts to the Treasury bill rate.136
Market research indicated that money market mutual funds which
invested solely in United States Government securities, regarded
as essentially riskless instruments, increased approximately ninety
percent during the period from December 1981 through September
1982. Investments in other types of mutual funds, however, in-
creased by only 13.6 percent 87 during approximately the same pe-
riod, although the yield on Treasury securities mutual funds
ranged from 260 to 80 basis points below the average yield on
money market mutual funds invested in other securities.315 These
findings indicate that investors are willing to accept a lower return
for the security of a riskless investment. The money market de-
135. Id. at 39. The value of deposit insurance might be approximated by comparing
short-term rates on government securities against the rates for commercial banks' certifi-
cates of deposit. From the period August 6 through October 15, 1982, the average difference
between the three-month Treasury bill rate and the ninety-day certificate of deposit rate
was 2.30%. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, United States Financial Data (Oct. 15, 1982),
reprinted in ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, app. table 3.
In one memorandum the DIDC's staff advised the DIDC: "[tihe insurance and conve-
nience aspects of a deposit instrument are valued by many individuals, suggesting that a
ceiling somewhat below these alternative yields [on money market mutual funds and other
open money market instruments] would still enable the new account to attract funds." Staff
Memorandum to DIDC, Design of Short-Term Deposit Instrument (June 23, 1982), quoted
in ICI Memorandum supra note 6, at 39-40. In another memorandum, the staff noted that a
"slight discount from the Treasury bill rate would only marginally alter the interest spread
between the new instrument and [money market funds] ... and the advantages of conve-
nience and deposit insurance might offset such a reduction in yield advantage .... ." Staff
Memorandum to DIDC, More Competitive Short-Term Deposits 15 (June 12, 1981) quoted
in ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, at 40-41.
Professor Paul M. Horvitz also has recognized the value of federal deposit insurance:
"It is interesting to speculate on how much below the money market fund rate the bank
could offer and still draw funds away from mutual funds. Two hundred basis points is not
an unreasonable guess, but even one hundred basis points is sufficient for profitability."
Horvitz, Deregulation and Financial Products and Services, Am. Banker, Sept. 24, 1982, at
4, quoted in ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, at 41.
136. ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, at 42-44.
137. Id. at 27-28.
138. Id.
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posit account's competitive advantage of insurance creates a risk-
less investment whose yield may exceed the comparable Treasury
bill rate. Thus, unlike a mutual fund investment, an insured de-
posit account permits the insured depositor not "to concern him-
self or herself with the quality of the credit decision that he or she
is making by depositing funds in the institution."18 9 If the deposits
were not insured, the depositors would consider the degree of risk
in the institution's portfolio. The risk, in turn, would affect the
rate of interest that the institution must pay to attract and retain
deposits.14 0 The ICI also noted that the insurance feature is a dis-
incentive for financial institutions to invest in Treasury bills be-
cause the insurance will protect the depositors while the institution
attempts to earn higher yields on speculative loans and risky
nongovernment securities. These provisions, therefore, in effect
might restrict the demand for government obligations and require
the Treasury to offer a higher rate for its securities, which would
increase the cost of servicing the federal debt.14 1 This system fur-
ther invites abuse because the FDIC and the FSLIC do not adjust
depository institutions' deposit insurance premiums to reflect the
degree of risk of these institutions.1 4 1
139. Id. at 43.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 43-44.
142. The ICI also objected to the establishment of the $2500 minimum initial deposit
requirement by the DEDC. It maintained that this requirement prevents the money market
deposit account from being "available to all depositors." Money market mutual funds offer
differing (and, in some cases, no minimum) investment requirements.... [S]mall in-
vestors would be subject to a regulatorally-mandated [sic] exclusion from investing in
the [money market deposit] [a]ccount not experienced by money market mutual fund
investors, a result which is also contrary to the purposes of DIDA to make market rates
of interest available to small investors.
Id. at 45. This requirement also makes the playing field unlevel, again in favor of commer-
cial banks.
Money market mutual funds may not properly agree among themselves to establish an
industry-wide minimum investment comparable to an initial minimum denomination
requirement of a [money market deposit] [a]ccount, and the imposition of a minimum
investment requirement would act as an industry-wide subsidy of the [money market
deposit] [a]ccount, rendering the Account not directly equivalent and not fairly com-
petitive with money market funds - both results contrary to the intent of section 327.
Id. at 45-46 (emphasis in the original). The ICI also urged that "safeguards comparable to
those of the Investment Company Act which insure that members of the investing public
receive accurate and complete information concerning the nature of their investment should
be adopted by the Committee concurrently with the Committee's authorization of the
[money market deposit] [a]ccount." Id. at 46-47.
The need for standards in this area is not based upon speculation. For example, in
two areas where depository institutions offer investment products which compete di-
rectly with mutual fund products, namely collective funds for retirement plans, and
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The ICI's third principal complaint about the new account
was that it would contravene the purpose of the Garn-St. Germain
Act and the DIDA because it would injure thrifts and small banks.
The ICI argued that an account whose rate is independent of the
market would enable the large money center banks to undercut the
thrifts and small banks. Many institutions might choose to pursue
a conservative rate-setting strategy " " with the new account to pro-
tect their own core deposits from other institutions. Others, how-
ever, might seize an opportunity to increase their asset base to the
extent that the profitable assets would compensate for the shifting
of their core deposits from low-cost deposits, such as conventional
time and saving deposits, to high-cost deposits, such as money
market deposit accounts. The large money center banks, either be-
cause they do not depend on core deposits for their funding or be-
cause they have the advertising and reputation to attract funds
from all over the country, many prefer the latter, more aggressive
pricing strategy. " ' These institutions have the resources to pro-
mote the account more aggressively than smaller institutions. The
money center banks also could pay an interest rate similar to the
rate they pay for certificates of deposit; this interest rate is higher
than the Treasury bill rate. The competitive pressures could force
smaller institutions to follow the same pricing strategy despite
their preference for a more conservative strategy. The result, in ef-
fect, would be predatory pricing.14 5
'retail repos,' marketing of these investments by depository institutions has been char-
acterized by exaggerations and, in some cases, misleading descriptions which, among
other things, deprive investors of the ability to make a true comparison of competing
investments.
Id. at 47 n.1. Additionally, the ICI maintained that the DIDC's regulations should not per-
mit customers to "write overdrafts since the existence of overdraft privileges is tantamount
to the extension of a loan secured by the customer's balance in the new Account." Id. at 48.
Finally, the ICI objected to an institution's ability to guarantee the rate of interest paid on
the account. "Such a guarantee is entirely inconsistent with the manner in which money
market mutual fund shares are offered to the public." Id. Such a guarantee also would place
a depository institution in a difficult financial position in times of changing market rates of
interest.
143. These conservative institutions would react solely because of the threat of compe-
tition and probably would choose a relatively safe rate, such as the Treasury bill rate, al-
lowing the institution to earn more profit. They also would impose high minimum initial
deposit and average deposit balances on the account and might attach service charges for
maintenance and transactions of the account. "Such a policy, if it could be followed, would
be likely to produce a rational trade-off between long-term benefits and short-term costs
derived by deposit institutions from the new account. Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 33-36.
145. Id. at 34.
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Price wars preceded the introduction of the new money mar-
ket deposit account and have continued. In California, for exam-
ple, Home Federal Savings & Loan Association announced that it
would offer "a rate bonus of 3 percentage points higher than the
average yield on money market funds" to customers who signed up
for the account before November 6, 1982, five weeks prior to the
account's official opening day.146 In Atlanta, First National Bank
"offered an introductory rate of 18.65%, touching off a rate war
involving other major banks in the state. Citizens and Southern
National Bank increased its rate to 21% before, like other banks,
dropping it to 10% after huge inflows of the new account. 1 47 The
ICI also argues that failing institutions, hoping to obtain growth
that would potentially offset past losses, ' 8 might decide to market
the account aggressively. Consequently, the FDIC and FSLIC
would bear the risk that these feeble institutions merely are accel-
erating their demise.
C. Analysis of the Garn-St. Germain Money Market Deposit
Account
The DIDA1 49 and the Gan-St. Germain Act 50 represent Con-
gress' attempt to develop "competitive equity among depository
and non-depository institutions that compete for the savings dol-
lar."151 Congress sought to build a "healthy and competitive
financial industry"1 52 that would protect the interests of the con-
sumers and enable depository institutions to remain solvent and
continue to compete in the industry.15 3 The restrictions on interest
rates payable by depository institutions deprived consumers, par-
146. Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).
147. American Banker, Dec. 27, 1982, at 3, col 3.
148. After all, if management sees near term failure as all but certain in the absence
of a successful "great gamble," and if ultimate losses from the failed venture are borne
not by the institution (which has very little more to lose in any event), but by a federal
deposit insurance agency, then a policy which is irrational from the point of view of
public policy may be quite rational from the point of view of the institution's
management.
ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, at 37.
149. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3509 (Supp. V 1982).
150. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503(c)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
151. H.R. REP. No. 842, 96th Cong., 2d Sees. 73 (1980), quoted in ICI Memorandum,
supra note 6, at 7.
152. The measures of the Gan-St. Germain Act to assist the thrifts through emer-
gency assistance measures and broadened asset powers illustrate this intent on the part of
Congress. See ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, at 7.
153. Id.
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ticularly small savers, of a market rate on their savings dollars. At
the same time, the disintermediation from accounts in depository
institutions to nondepository institutions, such as mutual funds,
that paid a market rate on savings threatened the solvency of
nondepository institutions. Congress enacted the DIDA to provide
an orderly elimination of Regulation Q's interest rate ceilings15 4
and to "provide all depositors with a market rate of return on their
savings" as soon as economically feasible.155 Congress ordered the
DIDC to pursue these objectives with regard for the safety and
soundness of depository institutions and further directed the
DIDC that "[t]he phase-out must be accomplished in a way that..
. insures competitive equity among depository and non-depository
institutions that compete for the savings dollar."156
Once again emphasizing free and fair competition in the
financial market place, 157 Congress enacted the Garn-St. Germain
Act of 1982 in an attempt to accelerate the process established
under the DIDA. The Act specifically authorized the DIDC to cre-
ate equitable competitive conditions in the financial marketplace
by permitting depository institutions to offer a new deposit ac-
count "directly equivalent to and competitive with money market
mutual funds .... ,,"58 From the consumer's viewpoint, the new
account must be equivalent to a money market mutual fund; from
the regulators' and the institutions' perspective, the account must
not have threatened the financial soundness of these institutions
nor must it have produced new competitive inequities between de-
pository and nondepository institutions. 59
Section 327 of the Garn-St. Germain Act required that the
DIDC set "[n]o limitation on the maximum rate or rates of inter-
est" on the account;160 the DIDC's regulations allow institutions to
"pay interest at any rate" on this new account.16 1 This provision
154. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
155. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3503(a), 3503(b) (Supp. V 1981).
156. H.R. REP. No. 842, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1980).
157. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
158. U.S.C.A. § 3503(c) (West Supp. 1983).
159. See ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, at 15-16.
160. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3503(c)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
161. 12 C.F.R. § 1204.122 (1982) (emphasis added). Mutual funds derive yields directly
from the returns on the securities in which they invest and deduct their costs of administra-
tion in order to compute the individual investor's yield. The investment process is far more
complex and the costs more difficult to ascertain for a depository institution. Loans and
investments are not traceable to specific deposits and the allocation of administrative costs
is hardly a precise science. Consequently, the relationship between the yield on assets and
the cost of liabilities is less direct and more difficult to calculate for a depository institu-
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enables depository institutions to price the account at rates sub-
stantially above or, if competition and market conditions permit,
substantially below, prevailing market rates for instruments with
similar risk characteristics. Theoretically, a commercial bank or
thrift institution could offer a rate higher than the mutual funds
rate in order to recapture or enhance its market share and later
reduce the rate below the mutual fund rate. This type of rate set-
ting practice amounts to predatory pricing, a result which hardly
comports with the policies of the DIDA and the Gan-St. Germain
Act. Such predatory pricing conduct is inconsistent with congres-
sional intent to provide a market rate of return to depositors and
to create a "level playing field"16 ' for financial institutions while
preserving the safety and soundness of these institutions. The leg-
islative history for these Acts indicates Congress' intent that banks
should index the rate of interest paid on this account to an appro-
priate market rate.163 If depository institutions paid such a rate,
consumers would receive a market yield on their deposits, the ac-
count would be competitive with money market mutual funds, and
the institution would be able to lend or invest the funds at a prof-
itable rate to preserve its financial soundness.
The FDIC or the FSLIC insures the new money market de-
posit account up to $100,000. This feature clearly gives depository
institutions a competitive advantage over mutual funds, which are
not insured. Thus, if the yields on both types of accounts are the
same, and certainly if the yield on the money market deposit ac-
count is higher, the consumer will choose the insured money mar-
ket account because the federal insurance provides an extra mea-
sure of security and effectively makes the investment riskless. An
equally attractive competitive advantage, especially to small sav-
ers, may be that deposit insurance also promotes confidence in the
soundness and safety of the banking and thrift industry.164 The de-
pository institutions, however, should not be permitted to abuse
the beneficial features of this new account by shifting undue risk
to the insuring agencies and the federal government. The two ac-
counts can be competitively equivalent and the consumer can re-
tion's money market account than for a mutual fund account. Theoretically, a depository
institution should index the yield on the money market account to its cost of funds rather
than to an average yield of money market funds.
162. See supra note 6.
163. See ICI Memorandum, supra note 6, at 22-26.
164. See generally Jacobs, The Framework of Commercial Bank Regulation: An Ap-
praisal, 1 NAT'L BANKING REV. 343 (1964).
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ceive a market return on his investment if the depository institu-
tions pay a market rate on the money market deposit account that
reflects the lack of risk to the depositor attributable to the insur-
ance feature. Short-term Treasury bills would indicate an appro-
priate rate, because as government-backed obligations, the invest-
ment in a bill is as safe as an insured deposit. Institutions paying
the Treasury bill rate then could lend or invest the funds in assets
at a yield sufficient to ensure profitability without assuming undue
risk.
A modification of the current federal deposit insurance system
to determine an institution's annual premiums according to its
risk-taking activities would alleviate further the concern that de-
pository institutions will adopt riskier investment practices. Since
the FDIC's inception in 1933,185 an institution's annual -insurance
premium has been a flat percentage of its deposits. Thus, the rate
bears no relationship to the particular institution's risk character-
istics. Although a flat rate system may have been appropriate in
1933 when the primary consideration was to implement insurance
coverage for depositors as quickly as feasible, the system perhaps
should become more flexible to meet changing conditions of the
present financial markets.168 The current flat rate system provides
an incentive for financial institutions to engage in speculative ac-
tivities, to the extent that regulation permits, because the insur-
ance agencies and ultimately the federal government bear a large
portion of the risk for those activities."' The insured money mar-
ket deposit account with no limit to its yield increases the likeli-
hood of risk-taking activities on the part of depository institutions
to obtain high yielding assets to cover the cost of the expensive
new money market account.
Indexing the new account's yield to the Treasury bill rate is
one means of discouraging depository institutions from engaging in
unreasonably risky investment practices. The lower yields that the
institutions will pay under this limitation will allow them to
achieve a satisfactory return by making less risky loans and invest-
165. The Banking Act of 1933 provided FDIC insurance for banks. The National
Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 401 (1976), created the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation (FSLIC) to provide insurance for savings and loan associations. Except for
periodic increases in the amount of coverage, the system has not undergone major changes
in 50 years. See Barnett, Horvitz & Silverberg, Deposit Insurance: The Present System and
Some Alternatives, 90 BANKING L.J. 304, 304 (1975).
166. See Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REv. 857, 886-88 (1971).
167. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19831 1159
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1129
ments. Additionally, the risk-taking inclinations of an institution
charging deposit insurance premiums commensurate with the risk
characteristics of each institution's investment and loan portfolio
will suppress the risk-taking inclinations of an institution. Higher
insurance premiums will offset the speculative profits possible
from higher risk investments. Regulators could use existing report-
ing and examination procedures to monitor institutions' portfolios.
Thus, the insurance feature, with proper administration, can be
consistent with the "level playing field"1 8 and the industry safety
and soundness objectives expressed by Congress.
Section 712 of the Garn-St. Germain Act requires the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administra-
tion each to conduct a study of the current system of deposit in-
surance.16 9 Specifically included among the topics for study was
the feasibility of utilizing a risk-related insurance premium rather
than the flat rate assessment.17 0 The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation recently submitted its study in which it proposed "a
risk-related premium program ... limited in scope. 1 71
168. See supra note 6.
169. Section 712 specifically provides:
(a) The FDIC, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and the National
Credit Union Administration Board shall each conduct a study of-
(1) the current system of deposit insurance and its impact on the structure and opera-
tions of depository institutions;
(2) the feasibility of providing depositors the option to purchase additional deposit
insurance covering deposits in excess of the general limit provided by law and the capa-
bilities of the private insurance system, either directly or through reinsurance, to pro-
vide risk coverage in excess of the general statutory limit;
(3) the feasibility of basing deposit insurance premiums on the risk posed by either the
insured institution or the category or size of the depository institution rather than the
present fiat rate system;
(4) the impact of expanding coverage of insured deposits upon the operations of the
insurance funds, including the possibility of increased or undue risk to the funds;
,(5) the feasibility of revising the deposit insurance system to provide even greater pro-
tection for smaller depositors while fostering a greater degree of discipline with respect
to large depositors;
(6) the adequacy of existing public disclosure regarding the condition and business
practices of insured depository institutions, and providing an assessment of changes
which may be needed to assure adequate public disclosure;
(7) the feasibility of consolidating the three separate insurance funds; and
(8) other related issues.
Gan-St. Germain Depository Institutions Amendments of 1982, § 712.
170. Id.
171. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC Deposit Insurance System Study,
reprinted in [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,544.
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V. CONCLUSION
Section 327 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act amends the DIDA and authorizes an account that banks and
thrift institutions have needed to enable them to compete for
funds and to continue to provide credit in the financial market-
place. The DIDC's regulation, however, permits these depository
institutions to offer a deposit account that is not "directly
equivalent to and competitive with money market mutual funds."
The regulation in effect created an insured account that is risk-free
from the depositor's perspective, and conceivably can pay a higher
yield, allow greater customer access, and provide more convenience
than mutual fund accounts. Depository institutions, deposits and
money market mutual funds' assets suggest that the money market
deposit account, when compared with mutual fund accounts, is
overly competitive. A recent Federal Reserve study estimates that
over $25 billion of the total money market deposits of $183.6 bil-
lion as of January, 1983, came from money market mutual funds.
Mutual fund assets, which had peaked at over $230 billion in early
December, 1982, have fallen by over $25 billion since the introduc-
tion of the new account.1 7 2
Because of the different regulatory frameworks for commercial
banking and investment banking, the task of designing a deposi-
tory institution instrument identical to a money market mutual
fund is an impossible one. Within the regulatory boundaries, how-
ever, the new account should combine and balance features to pro-
duce an instrument that can compete with - but not so handily
out compete with - the money market mutual fund account in
accordance with congressional intent. Pursuant to the Garn-St.
Germain directive, the DIDC should establish parameters within
which the depository institutions can set rates. In enacting the
DIDA and the Garn-St. Germain Act, Congress intended to pro-
vide the consumer a market rate of return on his savings dollars
and to preserve the financial soundness of depository institutions
by halting the disintermediation of funds to other instruments, es-
pecially the money market mutual funds. Consistent with these
objectives, depository institutions should be required to offer a
market rate of return that reflects the risk characteristics of the
instrument. In the case of an insured account, such as the money
market deposit account, the best index for that rate is the yield on
172. American Banker, Jan. 7, 1983, at 11.
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short-term Treasury bills.
The insurance feature of the new account, particularly when
the account is compared to the uninsured mutual funds, signifi-
cantly enhances the account's attractiveness to depositors. The
role of deposit insurance in providing stability and an element of
security to the banking system since 1933 indicates that insurance
is a desirable feature to depositors, the institutions, and the econ-
omy. Certainly, that feature of money market deposit accounts
should be maintained if other aspects of the account are adjusted
to minimize the competitive advantage that an insured account
provides to these institutions. The DIDC can achieve the objec-
tives of the DIDA and the Garn-St. Germain Act - to provide an
instrument competitive with money market mutual funds and to
promote the financial soundness of depository institutions - by
authorizing a yield on the instrument that reflects the value of the
insurance on the deposit and by requiring that the federal deposit
insurance agencies charge variable rate, risk indexed insurance pre-
miums."' The DIDC's current regulations induce institutions to
offer high rates to customers to attract deposits, to channel the
funds into speculative assets in order to maximize profits, and to
place inordinate risk on the federal insurance agencies and the fed-
eral government. Clearly, these practices are contrary to congres-
sional intent. Variable rate deposit insurance premiums would en-
courage institutions to maintain sound investment and loan
portfolios and thus would promote the financial soundness of the
financial marketplace.1 "
The implementation of these suggested modifications in the
DIDC's regulations would create a money market deposit account
that successfully balances the concerns of various interested par-
ties: depositors would receive market rate of return on a safe in-
vestment; depository institutions could compete with the money
market mutual funds on a "level playing field"; and the regulators
would have checks and balances in place to ensure the safety and
173. The FDIC and the FSLIC would assess premiums on institutions that would vary
with the riskiness of their assets. Examination procedures already are in place to determine
risk, although they arguably are not as effective in preventing bank failures as they should
be. The idea of variable rate or classified rate premiums is not a new one. See Jacobs, supra
note 164, at 345-46 (1964); Scott & Mayer, supra note 166, at 890-94; Barnett, Horvitz &
Silverberg, supra note 165, at 329-30.
174. The variable rate insurance system also complements the limitation of the yield
to the Treasury bill rate because that limitation, by reducing an institution's cost of funds,
minimizes the need for the institution to engage in speculative activities in order to cover
that cost and turn a profit.
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soundness of the institutions. Thus, within the parameters of a
complex regulatory framework, the modified version of the money
market deposit account would achieve the objectives of the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 and the Garn-St.
Germain Act of 1982.
BETTY R. TURNER

